

## Divergent Indian Perspectives on the Junagarh Accession in the Context of the Indian Independence Act 1947

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### Abstract

List of Indian varying standpoints over accessing Junagarh during different events happening between August 15, 1947 to November 09, 1947 show vast level of discrepancies in such a way that duality of Indian leadership over this issue outshines. As this study highlights all the discrepancies in the political perspective of Indian leadership, one of its examples is, at one side, India supported self-proclaimed provisional government under headship of Samaldas Gandhi against the announcement vis-a-vis the accession of Junagarh State with Pakistan, and claimed Hindu majority population of the state and the Two Nation Theory as the fundamental reasons of this occupation. However, on the other side, it is controlling numerous Muslim populated areas (currently within or part of Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Maharashtra, Assam, Kerala, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Gujarat and the Jammu and Kashmir) either by Redcliff-Nehru injustice or by direct occupation. Likewise, as India claims that Hindu population of Junagarh was against the accession of state to Pakistan and it had been gathered in Bombay for liberating Junagarh from Nawab's regime; this study comparatively analyzes this claim by the convention of Muslim Conference held on July 19, 1947 in Srinagar where Kashmiri Muslims had displayed their consent for joining Pakistan.

In line with the abovementioned argument, this study looks at articles 2(4), 7(1) and 19(3) of the Indian Independence Act 1947 with a critical lens that provides concrete ground to analyze falsifications between Indian standpoints and illegal actions for occupying not only Junagarh but also several other princely states (including vassal states and feudal jagirs). Argument-based responses to Indian duplicity within the ambit of Indian Independence Act 1947 not only deciphers flaws in foreign policy of Pakistan — foreign policy during last four to five decades regarding projecting Junagarh State Dilemma — but also appreciates Imran Khan's government to bring into account this issue at international fora once again. Moreover, by content analysis of the responses collected during the survey, study attempts to investigate what should be the responsibilities of President Office, Prime Minister Office, Information

Minister Office, Foreign Minister Office, and Overseas Pakistanis Minister Office in this regard.

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## Introduction

Paul Collier, a British development economist, defines “Greed” as informal but straightforward cost-benefit analysis among competitors where each segment tries to avail opportunities (Saygi, 2020). Keeping in view Paul Collier’s theoretical framework of “Greed versus Grievance”, this study looks at the Indian case of Junagarh in terms of interrogating the greed factor of India.

Historically, partition of the sub-continent has varied perspectives where pro-Indian and pro-Pakistan historians have contradictory views. The major problem from Indian side has been traced as the greed factor for increasing the “power circle” within the former territorial jurisdiction of British India. This investigation enables the analysts to holistically analyze the discrepancy between Indian standpoints for accessing Junagarh and its violations of Indian Independence Act 1947, a core document to decide the principles of accessing princely states between India and Pakistan (Asghar, 2021).

Analysis of different developments for proposing partition of India since 1940 clearly elaborates greed of Indian National Congress for turning down Two Nations Theory and claiming the entire subcontinent as its territory at different forums rejecting the say of other stakeholders (Sandhu, 2012). Situation became worst when dubious nature of articles 2(4), 7(1) and 19(3) in Indian Independence Act 1947 about future of princely states (including vassal states and feudal jagirs) facilitated desired interpretations from Congress leadership, Redcliff-Nehru injustice and forceful direct Indian occupation (Asghar, 2021).

Realistically, Indian greed for accession of Junagarh within the context of articles 2(4), 7(1) and 19(3) was exhibited when Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel claimed “Two Nations Theory / expected communal riots” as a justification for occupying Junagarh state, and, when Indian leadership assisted anarchist gathering of anti-Nawab elements in Bombay for creating de facto pro-Indian provisional government (Aarzi Hakumat) of Junagarh under the leadership of Samaldas Gandhi (Katke, 2015). At both points, India portrays its double-edged attitude. This is because India had already denied Two Nations Theory for occupying Jammu and Kashmir along with numerous other Muslim majority areas. Similarly, Indian leadership had also refuted peaceful political gathering of Kashmiri Muslim leaders under the platform of Muslim Conference in Srinagar to express the desire of majority of Kashmiris to join Pakistan (Puri, 2010, p. 4).

Undoubtedly, Indian and Pakistani historians are on the same page that Junagarh was the first state that announced its accession to Pakistan on August 15, 1947 (Gandhi, 2018). However, diversity between the announcements of accessions from Nawab of Junagarh, Khan Sahib of Bantva-Manavadar, Sheikh of Mangrol and jagirdars (feudals) of Babriawad firstly urges the study to find the nature of differences between international widespread literature belonging to India and Pakistan for either describing Junagarh dilemma or interpreting articles 2(4), 7(1) and 19(3) in the Indian Independence Act 1947 regarding justifying their arguments.

## **Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar in Internationally Widespread Literature: A Case in Point**

Whenever literature about 'partition of India' and the 'accession of princely states to India or Pakistan' is investigated, it is clearly highlighted that almost every internationally acclaimed book examines Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar within the context of Kashmir and other princely states. During the analysis of Asit Kumar Sen (1967), M. Aslam Qureshi (1976), Hameed Ali Khan Rai (1981), Sardar Ali Choudhry (1988), Sajal Nag (2007), Srinath Raghavan (2010), Rajendra Prasad (2010), Shahid M. Amin (2010), Josef Korbel (2015), Harsh V. Pant (2015) and it is evident that no author has described the annexation of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar to Pakistan and then the Indian occupation of both states within the individual context of socio-political statuses of these states.

On the one hand, Indian writers defend India's occupation while, on the other hand, Pakistani writers favor Pakistan's right over respective states. Nevertheless, till date, no author has reviewed the decision to annex respective states to Pakistan and later the illegal occupation of India within the context of the Indian Independence Act 1947. Therefore, it was strongly felt that not only the changing statements regarding Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar at different times from Indian leadership should be reviewed within the context of Indian Independence Act 1947, but also the views of intellectuals and researchers should be sought in this regard.

So, now the study figures out the articles 2(4), 7(1) and 19(3) of Indian Independence Act 1947 that helps in exploration of the possible ways to highlight the dilemma of Junagarh State (including Bantva-Manavadar, Mangrol and Babriawad) during 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **Articles 2(4), 7(1) and 19(3) of Indian Independence Act 1947**

Within Indian Independence Act of 1947, article 2(4) deals with the territories of India and Pakistan, while clause 04 of this article clearly says that no princely state under pressure will accede to India or Pakistan (Indian Independence Act, 1947). Similarly, article 7(1) of this act describes the future relationship of princely states with either Great Britain or with the newly states after the given date. Section a, b and c of the clause 01 of article 07 clearly discusses the end of all the agreements between princely states and the British Government but endnote of this clause emphasizes upon continuation of agreements related to post and telegraphs, transit and communication, custom and other relevant matters (Indian Independence Act, 1947). At the same time, as clause 03 of article 19 focuses upon construction of constituent assemblies of new dominions, endnote of this clause does not compromise on representation of princely states and tribal areas in the constituent assemblies of newly emerging dominions (Indian Independence Act, 1947).

Although, at the time of partition, 175 princely states were experiencing direct suzerainty of the central government of British India, whereas remaining princely states (including vassal states and feudal jagirs) had been dependent upon provincial governments heading by the governor, lieutenant governor or chief commissioner. Moreover, British Government had also defined the difference between the terms "suzerainty" and "dominion" in the section 18 of Interpretation Act of 1889 as; all the princely states (including vassals states and feudal jagirs) are the part of dominion within British India, while respective princely states experience suzerainty within their territorial jurisdiction as rewarded by the British India

(in the name of British Crown) (Pati & Ernst, 2007). None-the-less, ambiguous features of Indian Independence Act 1947 facilitated practices of Indian greed under dualism. For example;

- Only heads/rulers of princely states have been addressed in article 7(1-b), but signature requirement of either ruler or dewan (prime minister) for accession of any state with any new dominion is not mentioned (Asghar, 2021).
- Only the term “princely states” is used in the articles 2(4), 7(1) and 19(3) of the act, while no distinction or no separate plan is defined for vassal states or feudal jagirs (Asghar, 2021).
- Among princely states, no difference is defined between “salute states” and “non-salute states” in this act (Asghar, 2021).
- Act does not describe its foundations and ratification on communal bases (Asghar, 2021).
- Geographical association between any princely state and newly formed dominion is not mandatory (Asghar, 2021).

### **Chronological Technicalities within Indian Contradictory Perspectives for Accessing Junagarh State**

Besides the ambiguous nature of Indian Independence Act 1947 regarding future of princely states, Indian standpoints for accessing Junagarh State clearly exhibit not only its contradictory attitude, but technical flaws that highlighted between August 14, 1947 to November 09, 1947, such as:

- 1) As Junagarh was the first princely state to join Pakistan, Lord Mountbatten and Narasimha Gopalaswami Ayyangar agreed that Indian Independence Act does not require geographical connectivity of any princely state for joining either India or Pakistan. However, Patel expressed in one of his perspectives pertaining to the accession of Junagarh State with India because of geographical linkage. According to Rahul Noronha, as this is unofficial and without record, Lord Mountbatten had given the hint that princely states must be geographically associated with either India or Pakistan (Noronha, 2020).
- It begs a perennial question that whether Mountbatten had the power to interpret any provision of the Indian Independence Act 1947 as he wished. One aspect that is not mentioned at all in the law: how can anyone, whether from India or Pakistan, make it a law, or give it the status of a law? (Asim, 2020)
- 2) When the State of Junagarh was annexed to Pakistan, the Indian Deputy Prime Minister Patel asked Pakistan to withdraw the accession. He, at the same time, offered that India is ready to conduct a referendum in the state too (Nair, 2020).
- The request to withdraw the annexation and the offer to conduct the referendum in state clearly shows that India had recognized the annexation of the State of Junagarh to Pakistan and was aware that the accession of the Junagarh with Pakistan is legal in accordance with Article 7(1-b) (Asghar, 2021).
- 3) In United Nations Security Council, India highlighted that Junagarh’s accession to Pakistan was made against the will of the majority. They wanted to join India but Nawab ignored public sentiments (Hingorani, 2017, p. 132).

- But the Indian Independence Act 1947 clearly authorizes only a ruler/nawab of any princely state under article 7(1-b) to decide annexation with either India or Pakistan. Thus, the question arises that who has given the authority to India to know the will of the people or occupy any state by claiming on the basis of public will? (Asghar, 2021)
- 4) Vappala Pangunni Menon (secretary in the Ministry of the States chaired by Patel) when visited Junagarh for convincing Nawab regarding accession to India, he also threatened in case of refusal (Zuberi, 2006).
- This was also the clear violation of article 2(4) where it is written that no state would be pressurized for accession either with India or Pakistan (Asghar, 2021).
- 5) Additionally, at that time, Junagarh State had been political proximity with neighboring princely states and feudal jagirs (such as, Mangrol and Babriawad) due to attachment scheme 1943 introduced by certain amendments in the Indian Act of 1935 (Bangash, 2014). On the other hand, Bantva Manavadar was also a princely state but it chose to become vassal state of Junagarh in 1795. However, Menon argued that respective attachments and dependency have been ended by the implementation of Indian Independence Act 1947. Therefore, Junagarh State has no concerns with the State of Mangrol and feudal jagir of Babriawad. At that time, Nehru also wrote a letter to Pakistan and British Government that, if Nawab will not withdraw its forces from Mangrol and Babriawad, India will send its troops for taking over the control of respective territories (Ankit, 2016 ).
- Critics are unable to find any article or clause in Indian Independence Act 1947 which authorize Indian leadership to define the difference between princely state, vassal state or feudal jagirs. Moreover, if any state envisions its larger economic and security interests along with the welfare of its subjects in subordination to another major state, it does not necessarily mean that its autonomy is completely lost or that it is no longer a separate state. Union of two or more states can never be considered as a sole state by any international law or by Indian Independence Act 1947 (Asghar, 2021).
- History, at some points, becomes more critical in terms of analyzing historical events when different segments of academia define one event in distinct paradigms. Same is the case with British India, and the later India and Pakistan where it has been difficult to trace differences between princely states and feudal jagirs; especially, when events happened in contradictions. As some feudal jagirs had been treated as the princely states like Mohrapur Jagir, Chirgaon (one of the parts of Hast-Bhaiya; the group of feudal jagirs), Purwa (one of the part of Chaube Jagirs, having status of British protectorate during 1823 to 1947) and Punial; historians from both sides have different perceptions about rights of their heads/rulers/feudal lords regarding accessing with either India or Pakistan. In between the debates about having "right" and "no right", Indian Independence Act 1947 is silent on this issue (Asghar, 2021).
- 6) When Menon triggered Samaldas Gandhi (a nephew of Mahatma Gandhi) to launch political gathering against Nawab of Junagarh in Bombay, he announced a parallel de facto provisional government of Junagarh with the support of Indian Government, Gujarat States Organization and All India States Peoples' Conference (also called Lok Parishads). Although, Indian Government fully sponsored this gathering, allowed de facto government to take control of Junagarh State, but

when Pakistan exposed Indian activities and sponsorship in UNSC, India denied accepting this. At the same time, India declared all the gatherings and activities under the leadership of Samaldas Gandhi as the popular public expression in the state against decision of Nawab (JMC, 2021).

- Firstly, when India claims the de facto government of Samaldas Gandhi as the popular expression of the local people within the state, the question raises that when Samaldas Gandhi was the citizen of Junagarh State? How a person born in Porbandar State (a neighboring state of Junagarh) can claim to be a voice of the people of Junagarh State? (Asghar, 2021)
  - Secondly, when Muslim Conference organized a convention in Srinagar on July 19, 1947 where Muslim leaders from entire Jammu and Kashmir gathered, adopted a resolution in favor of accessing Pakistan, India remains silent for respective similar political gathering as it staged later in Bombay against Junagarh's accession to Pakistan (Asghar, 2021). Another difference is; Pakistan was proposed at the time of convention held by Muslim Conference in Srinagar whereas; India had not only been established as a separate sovereign state at the time political gathering under leadership of Samaldas Gandhi in Bombay, but it also sponsored, funded and backed all the activities against the Junagarh's accession to Pakistan. Therefore, this is the reason that critics declare Kashmiris' demand for accessing Pakistan as the popular public will as compare to political gathering in Bombay under absolute power of India as a state (Asghar, 2021).
  - Thirdly, what is the legality if Gujarat States Organization or All India States Peoples' Conference rectified self-claimed provisional government of Junagarh? There is no provision in the Indian Independence Act 1947 which permits any organization or union of princely states to compel any state among them to join either India or Pakistan (Asghar, 2021).
- 7) For forcefully urging Nawab for withdrawing his decision regarding accession with Pakistan and joining India. The provisional government and its stalwart militants blocked all the ways that lead to Junagarh State. Although, India as a state denied having being involved in the matter, but it did not discourage this blockade. As a result, this blockade caused lack of basic necessities in the state. In order to avoid any potential humanitarian crisis, when Nawab moved towards Pakistan for seeking help, Indian army under the shadow of militants leading by Samaldas Gandhi entered in the state and took over the control of state administration on November 09, 1947 (DNA-Correspondent, 2007).
- As endnote of an article 7(1) of the Indian Independence Act 1947 compels India and Pakistan not to stop princely states for any matter about post and telegraphs, transit and communication, customs and relevant; India clearly violated this provision by either triggering, facilitating or not discouraging state's blockage. Furthermore, Menon claimed that Nawab had delegated the powers to Shah Nawaz Bhutto for deciding state's future, and therefore, he reversed the Nawab's decision in favor of India. Critics are of the view that where is the authority letter and what is its legality when article 7(1-b) only authorizes head/ruler of the state to decide the state's future (Asghar, 2021).
  - Moreover, some critics declare the documentation of Indian accession of Junagarh State as fake. This is because, India took over the control of state administration on November 09, 1948 while, Shah Nawaz Bhutto had also left the state on November 08, 1948 for Pakistan due to the fear of communal violence under the leadership of Samaldas Gandhi (Zaheer, 2021).

- 8) Yaqoob Khan Bangash quotes two letters of Shah Nawaz Bhutto which he wrote firstly to the Government of Pakistan and secondly to the regional commissioner (Bangash, 2014).
- After taking over the state administration from the Nawab, Shah Nawaz Bhutto wrote a letter to Liaqat Ali Khan that stated:

*"The Indian Dominion seem to have made out a perfect plan of strangling Junagadh on all fronts, internal and external, with the help of our own feudatories who have been bought over with promises of independence and aggrandizement; our supplies are being cut off. Non-Muslims are leaving Junagadh territory by sheer fright of threatened conflict, Muslim refugees from disturbed parts of upper India are pouring in; I earnestly appeal to the Pakistani Government for help" (Bangash, 2014).*

Afterwards, he wrote another letter to the regional commissioner Buch:

*"The Junagadh Government, therefore, have requested that in order to avoid bloodshed, hardship, loss of life and property and to preserve the dynasty, you should be approached to give your assistance to the administration" (Bangash, 2014).*

- Irrespective of what Indian leadership claims, the theme of both letters clearly exhibits that Shah Nawaz Bhutto, at one side, asking help from the Government of Pakistan against blockade facilitated or sponsored by India, along with requesting an aid for Muslim refugees from different other territories of India coming in Junagarh as a federated part of Pakistan. At the same time, his letter to regional commissioner never shows his orientations towards India. He sought help only for protection and preservation of the socio-political and territorial structure of the state, and to avoid any kind of unrest in the state (Bangash, 2014).

After taking over the control of state, Nehru admitted in the telegram send to Liaqat Ali Khan where he wrote that;

*"In view of special circumstances pointed out by Junagadh Dewan - that is the Prime Minister of Junagadh - our Regional Commissioner at Rajkot has taken temporarily charge of Junagadh administration. This has been done to avoid disorder and resulting chaos. We have, however, no desire to continue this arrangement and wish to find a speedy solution in accordance with the wishes of the people of Junagadh. We have pointed out to you previously that final decision should be made by means of referendum or plebiscite. We would be glad to discuss this question and allied matters affecting Junagadh with representative of your government at the earliest possible moment convenient to you. We propose to invite Nawab of Junagadh to send his representatives to this conference (Khan, 2019)".*

And, in reply, Liaqat Ali Khan argued:

*"Your telegram informing that your Government had taken charge of Junagadh was received by me on November 10, 1947. Your action in taking over State Administration and sending Indian troops to state without any authority from Pakistan Government and indeed without*

*our knowledge, is a clear violation of Pakistan territory and breach of International law, Indian Government's activities on accession of Junagadh to Pakistan have all been directed to force the State to renounce accession and all kinds of weapons have been used by you to achieve this end. We consider your action in taking charge of Junagadh Administration and sending Indian troops to occupy Junagadh to be a direct act of hostility against Pakistan Dominion. We demand that you should immediately withdraw your forces, and relinquish charge of administration to the rightful ruler and stop people of Union of India from invading Junagadh and committing acts of violence" (Khan, 2019).*

- During the analysis of respective conversation between both leaders, it has been highlighted that Indian occupied Junagarh when it had become the official part of the Pakistan. In the same way, whether question mark over originality, India claims that it took over the state administration on special circumstances highlighted by Dewan. The rudimentary question is that if Dewan did this, what was his credibility as a subordinate of the Nawab before or after September 13, 1947 when Pakistan officially recognized Junagarh accession? In addition, Nehru argued that India wants to conduct referendum regarding examining will of the people of Junagarh. If India follows respective democratic principle, why not it followed during accessing numerous Muslim majority princely states, such as, Balasinor State (founded by Babis of Junagarh), Banganapalle State, Baoni State, Basoda State, Bhopal State, Hyderabad State, Jafarabad State, Janjira State, Jaora State, Kamadhia, Khadal State, Kurwai State, Loharu State, Malerkotla State, Mohammadgarh State, Palanpur State, Pataudi State, Pathari State, Radhanpur State, Ramas State, Rampur State, Sachin State, Savanur State, Tonk State, and the State of Jammu and Kashmir (Asghar, 2021).

As an artificial exhibition, India conducted referendum in February 15, 1948 in Junagarh, Bantva-Manavadar and Babriawad under its own military patronage. Although, legal advisor to Lord Mountbatten, Walter Monckton advised him to engage with Pakistan for any kind of plebiscite in Junagarh because Nawab has already accessed the state with Pakistan, but India neither allowed United Nations nor allow Pakistan to send observers (Ankit, 2016 ).

- 9) On the other hand, India had also taken over the state administration in Bantva-Manavadar on October 22, 1947 (Khan, 2019). Indian police entered in the state, and Ghulam Moinuddin Khanji was placed under house arrest (Buyers, 2010). As India conducted artificial referendum in the state on February 15, 1948, it exhibited results of the referendum in two parts. The prime motive of highlighting separate referendum results of Bantva and Manavadar by India was to show the socio-political division between Bantva and Manavadar. When numerous Indian historians indicate Bantva as the state or feudal jagir headed by Khan Himmat Khan, while Manavadar as the princely state (or vassal state of Junagarh) headed by Ghulam Moinuddin Khanji, their aim is to disengage this territory from the Junagarh State dilemma (Asghar, 2021).
- Historically, states have been forming, growing, shrinking, and disappearing. If one intends to look at the territories in any state in pre-1947 context, then historians can consider any area to be part of different states during different times. Therefore, when time comes for the decision-making regarding accessing the states, the demarcation of states at a certain time is considered final, and the decision of accession is made on the basis of that specific demarcation. Thus, Indian act of



projecting Bantva and Manavadar as two historically separate territories is falsified hypothesis that can never be proved (Asghar, 2021).

- 10) According to one of the leading Indian historians, Rajmohan Gandhi argues that “Patel once desired Hyderabad for India, not Kashmir. However, accession of Junagarh with Pakistan changed the game” (Gandhi, 2018). He further says that Hyderabad, Junagarh, Mangrol, Babriawad, Kalat, and Jammu and Kashmir even signed Standstill Agreement with India and Pakistan, but Junagarh’s accession to Pakistan diverted his mind with anger. Similarly, he also said that Indian leadership had also put pressure on the rulers of Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagarh for accession with India during different times. Another significant point that has been extracted from his critical analysis about Indian occupation of Junagarh is; he admits Manavadar, Mangrol and Babriawad were Junagarh's feudatories (Gandhi, 2018).

By evaluating facts describing by Rajmohan Gandhi, study finds:

- Indian leadership had already designed its mindset regarding which state should go towards Pakistan or India. And, this is again clear violation of article 2(4) in Indian Independence Act of 1947 that provided freedom of decision to the rulers of princely states for choosing their states' future (Asghar, 2021).
  - As Mangrol and Babriawad signed Standstill Agreement with India and Pakistan, this event exhibited ambiguous nature of Indian Independence Act 1947 once again that neither highlights any distinction between "princely state", "vassal state" and feudal jagir" nor defines time-limitation for considering finalization of any state or states' union boundaries. As attachment scheme in the Indian Act of 1935 encouraged states union, Indian Independence Act 1947 is silent for either patronage of states union has to decide state's future or each state separately as per its pre-1935 territorial autonomous status. This is the reason that Nawab of Junagarh along with Pakistan claims that the State of Mangrol and feudal jagir of Babriawad had lacked the discretion regarding accessing (Asghar, 2021).
- 11) Adrija Roy Chowdhury and Pranav Asoori, the Indian journalists, say that Indian leadership got enraged when it observed Junagarh's accession to Pakistan as against Jinnah's Two Nations Theory (Roychowdhury, 2017) (Asoori, 2020).
- If India justifies its anger against Jinnah’s violation of Two Nations Theory for accessing Junagarh State, questions among intellectuals rise that whether Indian leadership actually recognizes or opposes Two Nations Theory.
  - Although, almost all the socio-political segments within India and Pakistan accept that partition of India has occurred on the bases of Two Nations Theory, but the fact remains that the draft of Indian Independence Act 1947 does not define partition on communal bases. Therefore, the right of deciding accession was given to head/ruler of the princely states and not to the public will (exhibited either by political gathering, protests or referendum). However, if India recognizes Two Nations Theory, then what is the justification of its control over numerous Muslim populated areas (currently within or part of Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Maharashtra, Assam, Kerala, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Gujarat and the Jammu and Kashmir) either by Redcliff-Nehru injustice or by direct occupation (Asghar, 2021).

## Political Economy of Indian Accession of Junagarh

This is a fact that the concept of "greed" as mentioned above often forces individuals to adopt dualism towards one another. It also encourages states to deprive one another from their rights. If we take the war phenomenon in point, then Collier's notion of greed can further be illustrated. The study of wars shows that behind every war, there is some sort of greed that belongs to one or both of the states. While the war economy does not ignore the greed of any third power in the war between the two states (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Same is the case with Indian occupation of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar.

The Indian leadership may ignore Indian Independence Act 1947 or present various justifications for its varying rhetoric regarding the occupation of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar but the economic significance of both states can never be overlooked here which compelled India to occupy the respective territories (Asghar, 2021).

Being connected to the Arabian Sea, the existence of the Junagarh State at the most important geostrategic location made the state significant in various ways. Till 1947, the economic worth of Junagarh indicates that it was self-sufficient and was also capable of exporting (Corcoran & Fois, 2021) (Asghar, 2021).

The state not only had large reserves of limestone but was also rich in many minerals due to its hilly terrain. The abundance of forests not only made the state self-sufficient in timber and foodstuffs, but also other parts of British India were beneficial from respective stuff. Similarly, in agricultural commodities of state, such as, wheat, cotton, oil seeds, bananas, mangoes, onions and garlic were also supplied not only to the other parts of British India but numerous other regions of the world that caused collection of huge revenue (Corcoran & Fois, 2021) (Asghar, 2021). Although this study could not find any appropriate data regarding state's planning in terms of promoting tourism, but numerous foreigner visitors like Edward Balfour (1862), William Dwight Whitney (1898) and Benjamin Eli Smith (1899) have described Junagarh in their travelogues or memoirs (Balfour, 1862, pp. 124-125) (Whitney, 1898, pp. 105-107) (Smith, 1899, p. 170). It shows that Junagarh was also considered to be of international importance in terms of tourism.

Apart from all these, the state's seaports and sea lanes along coastal areas like Chorwad, Veraval, Sutrapada, Velan, Sarkhadi, Rajpara and Jafarabad were further enhancing the geo-economic worth of the state. The sea route was connecting the state not only with Pakistan but also with other parts of the world, which was causing increment in state exports (Asghar, 2021).

On the other hand, Bantva-Manavadar was not associated with Arabian Sea geographically but dependent upon Junagarh State in this regard. However, prominent agricultural products like wheat, cotton and vegetables had enabled the state to economically grow. Same was the case with feudal jagir of Babriawad, whereas majority of administrative affairs related to seaport of Mangrol were also the subject of Junagarh State. Along with other seaports of Junagarh, this port was also famous for fishing industry (Asghar, 2021).

## **Dilemma of Junagarh and Foreign Policy of Pakistan during 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

This is never as if Pakistan has ever recognized India's occupation of Junagarh or stopped showing the areas of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar on its map. Although, it has been a tragedy of Pakistan's foreign policy for the last few decades that only Kashmir has been mentioned at every international forum, and there was no discussion regarding Indian occupations upon the state of Junagarh, Bantva-Manavadar and numerous other Muslim-majority areas since 1947 to onwards. However, the second decade of the 21st century will always be remembered because Pakistan not only once again began to declare Junagarh, Bantva-Manavadar and Sir Creek as its territories at every international forum. In the event of the unveiling new map of Pakistan on August 04, 2020, attention was also drawn to the illegal occupation of these areas by India (Siddiqui, 2020).

Although, India strongly objected the new map, but Pakistan's strong rhetoric coerced most of the countries to remain silent on this issue. This was because of their political and economic interests with both; India and Pakistan. Another reason of this silence may be that these countries consider the issue of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan; therefore, they do not want to interfere (Zaheer, 2021). However, when Russia hosted the National Security Advisors' meeting of SCO member states, Ajit Dovel walked out from the meeting only because the National Security Advisor of Pakistan Moeed Yousaf had posted a new map of Pakistan in his background where the territories of Junagarh, Manavadar, Sir Creek and Kashmir were declared as Pakistani areas. But no one member state including Russia objected to his leaving the meeting (Sahai, 2020).

This time, SCO consists upon China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan as permanent members; Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia as observer states; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey as dialogue partners; and 'Association of Southeast Asian Nations', 'Commonwealth of Independent States', 'United Nations' and Turkmenistan as guest attendances. But, no one supported or appreciated Ajit Dovel's left over the meeting or, Indian objections over map projection or map authentication. Thus, analysts assume this as the first diplomatic success in the international arena with regard to Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar (Zaheer, 2021).

Although support for Pakistan's position on the map at the SCO forum is a start, but Pakistan still has a long way to go to find a lasting solution of this dilemma. For this purpose, this study conducts a survey where professors were consulted and asked about the policies of the State of Pakistan regarding the accession of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar to Pakistan. Another motive of this survey is to collect the intellectual perspectives about how Pakistan can expose India's illegal occupation of respective areas as well as how Pakistan can become the voice of the subjugated people of these occupied territories all over the world.

## **Sample**

The convenient random sampling of the study (N = 20) consists upon professors of Pakistan Studies, History and Political Science with equal ratio from four institutions; The Islamia University of Bahawalpur, Sargodha University sub-campus Bhakkar, Government Postgraduate College Bhakkar and Government Postgraduate College Asghar Mall, Rawalpindi.

## Instrument

A semi-structured questionnaire is designed for measuring as well as examining intellectuals' perspective about foreign policy of Pakistan towards Junagarh, Bantva-Manavadar and Kashmir in a way that what Pakistan should do to highlight respective dilemmas during 21<sup>st</sup> century. Among two parts of the questionnaire; first part is based upon four structured questions, provides an option of YES and NO to the participants. However, reason for choosing YES or NO has to be provided in descriptive way. At the same time; second part consists upon 07 open-ended questions, gives the diverse content that analyzes via Nvivo v.10 software.

## Results

The following table and interpretations exhibit the results drawn from the structured and open-ended sections of questionnaire through distinct statistical formulas and content analysis techniques respectively.

### Part 01

| Structured Questions |   |   |      |     |
|----------------------|---|---|------|-----|
| No.                  | Questions   |   | YES  | NO  |
| 1                    | Do you believe that Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar are the federated parts of Pakistan?  |   | 100% | 0   |
| 2                    | (a)   | Do you think that the dilemmas of Junagarh and Kashmir can be resolved as alternative to each other?  | 35%  | 65% |
|                      | (b)   | Do you consider Junagarh and Kashmir as two cases of separate nature within Indo-Pak subcontinent, must not be considered as alternative to each other? | 65%  | 35% |
| 3                    | Do you consider Junagarh and Kashmir as two cases of separate nature within Indo-Pak subcontinent, must not be considered as alternative to each other? |   | 30%  | 70% |

As questions no. 2 and 3 ask the reason of the response given by the participants, 35% respondents of 2(a) assumes dilemmas of Junagarh and Kashmir as alternative to each other because of geography and the public will of majority. On the other hand, 65% respondents of 2(b) argue that Junagarh and Kashmir are the two distinct issues within the Indo-Pak subcontinent where Junagarh is linked via sea route while, Kashmir is geographically associated with Pakistan. Moreover, Kashmiris showed their pre-partition public will in favor of futuristic Pakistan in July 19, 1947 without any foreign support whereas; India exhibited post-partitioned sponsored gathering against Junagarh accession to Pakistan.

At the same time, 70% respondents of question 3 disagreeing foreign policy of Pakistan towards Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar argue that Pakistan is not fully involve in proper projection of respective dilemma. Even the territories of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar have once again been added in the map of Pakistan but neither the clause 'a' nor the clause 'd' of article 01 in the Constitution of 1973 specifies Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar as the federated or accessed parts of Pakistan. However, 30%

respondents of this question favor foreign policy of Pakistan towards Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar, consider exhibition of respective territories within the map domestically and internationally (at SCO forum) as good sign that would definitely affect Indian illegal position.

## Part 02

By content analysis of open-ended questions presented in part 02, study comes to know that;

- 1) 95% says that the 'President of Pakistan' should be entitled with the "President of Pakistan, Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar" until the article 01 in the constitution of 1973 does not specify respective states as the federated parts of Pakistan.
- 2) 85% desires to see the title of prime minister of Pakistan as the "Prime Minister of Pakistan and the Representative of the States of Junagarh, Bantva-Manavadar, and the Jammu and Kashmir". At the same time, 15% argue that there must also be federal minister for the affairs of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar similar to the federal minister for the affairs of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.
- 3) 70% wants to see "PTV Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar" (or simply PTV Junagarh) as the responsibility of federal information ministry to truly project Indian illegal occupation.
- 4) 90% think that the separate desk should be established at each embassy of Pakistan for the people of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar, which should not only offer nationality but visa-free regime (after scrutiny). Respondents, at this point, quote once the Chinese policy of visa-free regime for the people of Arunachal Pradesh.
- 5) 30% wish to look the advertisements offer the facilitations by the federal ministry for overseas Pakistanis regarding solving the issues of the people of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar in abroad.
- 6) 65% think that there are not only the responsibilities of president and prime minister offices, and different federal ministries of Pakistan, but former ruling authorities of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar should also comprehend their own responsibilities for projecting this dilemma. For this purpose;
  - There should weekly press conferences for projecting Indian misconducts, violation of human rights and malpractices in Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar.
  - Nawab or Prime Minister of Junagarh should address to the nation each month that should be telecasted on all news channels.
  - There should be nomination or appointment of the state ministers/advisors for human rights, information and broadcasting, and inter-faith harmony. And, they should be responsible for frequent media talks and press releases regarding highlighting issue of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar in relevant dimensions.
- 7) 55% suggests constitutional amendments such as;
  - Territories of not only Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar but Gilgit-Baltistan and Jammu and Kashmir should be clearly declared as the federated parts of Pakistan (either as the provinces, federal administrative territories or federated states) in the article 01 of the constitution. For this purpose, government of Pakistan should not concentrate upon any international pressure but argue that Indian occupation can never undo pre-partition public will of Kashmiris, and partition-

timed accession of the princely states of Junagarh, Bantva-Manavadar, Hunza, Nagar, and feudal jagirs of Punial, Kuh, Ghizar and Yasin to the Pakistan.

- There should be representation of Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar in National Assembly and Senate.
- Like Kashmir Committee, there should be Junagarh Committee and Bantva-Manavadar committees at federal level.
- Provisional Junagarh and Bantva-Manavadar secretariats should be established in Islamabad as current Nawab of Junagarh Muhammad Jahangir Khanji has also demanded (Nazar, 2020).

## Recontextualization of Junagarh State Dilemma

Critical analysis of Indian Independence Act 1947, Indian practices and the content analysis of responses during survey assist recontextualization and new historicism to the Junagarh State dilemma. Study traces;

- 1) Authentication of public will regarding joining anyone among two states can only be acceptable before or at the time of partition. Post-partition exhibition of public will in favor of a party which has already occupied the respective territory claiming by other party at the same time too, has become disputed. Therefore, the issues of Junagarh and Kashmir are distinct in nature where Kashmiris had exhibited their consent in favor of newly emerging Muslim state before the birth of Pakistan. Similarly, Junagarh was the first princely state that declared its accession with the Pakistan very next day after independence (Zaheer, 2021) (Asghar, 2021).
- 2) No one article of Indian Independence Act 1947 discriminates between princely state, vassal state and feudal jagir. However, symbolic dependency because of personal relationship can never means Bantva-Manavadar as a part of Junagarh State but a separate princely state. On the other hand, complete financial dependency of Mangrol and Babriawad covered them under the Junagarh patronage (Zaheer, 2021) (Asghar, 2021).
- 3) Geographical linkage was not mandatory as per Indian Independence Act 1947 (Zaheer, 2021) (Asghar, 2021).
- 4) Referendum for accession in any former princely state cannot be acceptable when anyone among two states has already occupied the respective territory. In case of Junagarh, India had recognized Junagarh's accession to Pakistan but later, it forcefully ended the writ of Nawab in the state, entered its troops, and then conducted so-called referendum. Similarly, referendum in Jammu and Kashmir would only be valid when pre-partitioned wish of Kashmiris would be honored as well as electoral college for referendum will be based upon population ratio of Muslims and Hindus as per the 1947's demography of the state (Zaheer, 2021) (Asghar, 2021).
- 5) If India can sign Standstill Agreement with Babriawad that was not the princely state but a feudal jagir completely dependent and subordinate to Junagarh, it means that India recognized no discrimination between princely state, vassal state and feudal jagir but only tries to disturb Pakistan by declaring Gilgit-Baltistan as disputed territory where self-sufficient feudal jagirs of Punial, Kuh, Ghizar and Yasin announced their accession to Pakistan at the time of partition (Zaheer, 2021) (Asghar, 2021).

## Conclusion

Hence, study proves that Junagarh including Bantva-Manavadar, Mangrol and Babriawad is the part of Pakistan, and India had once recognized this accession. However, there is still a lot of work to be done by the government of Pakistan to highlight the Junagarh dilemma, so that not only the federation of Pakistan under the Indian Independence Act 1947 would be completed but also the duplicitous arguments from various quarters of India can be exposed before the world.

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